George Marshall, Roosevelt and his advisors decided that the war in Europe was their first priority, everything was to be focused on fighting and ending the war in Europe. Then the Pacific would come next, until then the Pacific Units were to fight the best war they could and hold off the Japanese as best they could.
The Allies' "Europe First" strategy is well documented and wasn't even a secret during the war. The early priorities were to 1) keep Australia in the war and 2) keep China in the war. The campaign for Guadalcanal demonstrated the understanding of air power in the conflict. A Japanese base there would threaten the supply lines to Australia so the U.S. attacked with what they had, Marines with Springfields. More sailors were lost in the sea actions than Marines and soldiers on land. But the key was the airfield. The U.S. Navy saw the Pacific as their war.
Douglas MacArthur understood the need to extend his "bomber line" and his island hopping strategy was defined by air power that led to the liberation of the Philippines. He, of course, constantly hammered his bosses for more of everything.
IMHO the Pacific war suffered from a Europe First syndrome by the media. Newspapers, magazines, and a few broadcasters dispatched correspondents to the battle fronts for news and features, but what journalist wants to go to New Guinea when he can go to London? That's why guys like Andy Rooney and Walter Cronkheit received special training to fly missions with the 8th Air Force, but you didn't find many (any?) going along on B-24s of the 5th.
To me what is the story here is not so much Europe First (someone had to make a decision), but what the troops did with what they had. Just look at photos of mechanics stripped down to shorts in the jungle maintaining the most technical equipment of the day. Dad was in India as a pilot and still endured jungle rot on his feet for the rest of his life. He spent his own money on any number of medications since the VA didn't consider that a disability.