Blackie I don't know anything about the truthfulness of the various authors, but I do know that at least three ships would have had navigators and bombardiers with complete mission briefing and requisite equipment to lead the group. First lead, Second and third.

In theory, the others would have been ready and able to take over as soon as the lead ship was knocked out. In reality, it didn't always work that way.

I'll leave it to the navs to elaborate, but I know that the backup couldn't/didn't always pick up the navigation points along the way and could be behind when thrust into the lead position.

Hence gain altitude and get bearings.

Often reality and events are distorted by time and memory. I'm not knocking the recollections of someone many years after an event. Heck my father remembers some events as very different than the "official" history wrote them. But events can be clouded by anger, frustration, sorrow, etc. Who knows?

What did the crew debriefs say? Do they still exist?

Ken

Ken Alexander
Son of 1st Lt. Clair B. Alexander Jr.
Pilot, B-24s: 10/12/1944 - 04/24/1945
15th AF, 49th Wing, 461st BG, 764th BS
Torretta Airfield, Cerignola, Italy

Phillip Ardery was also the author of "Bomber Pilot". In this book he gave a good account of the Ploesti mission. Medal of Honor winner Lloyd "Pete" Hughes was a very good friend of Ardery and grew up in Refugio, TX where I now live and there are still people around who knew him as a young man. He had the reputation of keeping his younger brothers and their friends out of trouble.
 
Vic

Guys:
Where did Killer Kane get that "Killer" name in the firstplace?
bjsassy90

Blackie,

According to Kenn C. Rust's book, "The 9th Air Force in WWII", he states:

With the 376th leading, the bombers streamed out across the Mediterranean. Three and one-half hours after take-off, near the island of Corfu, the 376th began climbing from 4,000 to 10,000 feet. The lead Liberator, flown by 1st Lt. Brian W. Flavelle, suddenly wobbled its wings, made a sharp steeply banked turn and went into a dive. At 100 feet the plane attempted to pull out but went into a tight spiral and dove into the sea carrying with it the lead navigator for the mission. Another 376th plane pulled out of formation to try and help but to no avail. This second plane, unable to climb back up and join the others, returned to base carrying with it the deputy route navigator. Lt. John Palm now moved into the leading position and his navigator, Lt. William Wright was suddenly mission route navigator.

The 376th formation was now dispersed and continuing north past the turning point to the east at Corfu, with the 93rd Group following it. They tightened up again and turned to the east meeting rising clouds at the Albanian border. Col. Keith Compton, 376th CO, climbed his Group to 16,000 feet and flew through the tops of the clouds with the 93rd Group following directly behind. The three remaining groups, Col. Kane in HAIL COLUMBIA leading with the 98th, had made their briefed turn at Corfu after delaying for some minutes after the lead plane went down, waiting in vain for the 376th to make that turn. [I don't know how you wait for several minutes. Did they circle? Weave? And if they did circle, why couldn't the deputy lead climb and catch up with the rest of the formation? -Ken] The three groups then flew east, making a direct penetration at 14,000 feet through the cloud front on their way to the target area. The sum of the events which took place near Corfu created a gap between the first two groups and the last three so that the bombers proceeded from her to the target in two distinct formations.

At approximately 1110 hours, the 376th with 26 aircraft reached the Initial Point, the small straggling town of Pitesti. Altitude was reduced to 500 feet off the ground and the aircraft roared on toward the final IP, Floresti. From it a rail line led at a fifty-degree angle from the flight path to Ploesti. However, halfway to Floresti was yet another little town, Targoviste, which also had a rail line running from it at an approximate fifty-degree angle to the southeast. At the low altitude the Liberators were now flying, Col. Compton (with General Ent in the plane with him) mistook Targoviste for Floresti and erroneously concluded the leader, Lt. Palm, was overshooting the IP. Accordingly, he ordered a turn made. [Breaking radio silence-Ken] The 376th, immediately followed by the 93rd carried out this order despite a number of protests from some planes….

Who was the deputy lead aircraft? He was certainly in the wrong leaving the formation to see if he could help the fallen lead a/c.

Col. Compton made a grievous error by not trusting his expert navigator, albeit third-string, with knowing his business. He trained and memorized his route and was spot-on. Breaking radio silence compounded his error.

Forget what I said before (if you haven't already) I can see how someone might be bitter about what happened.

Ken

Ken Alexander
Son of 1st Lt. Clair B. Alexander Jr.
Pilot, B-24s: 10/12/1944 - 04/24/1945
15th AF, 49th Wing, 461st BG, 764th BS
Torretta Airfield, Cerignola, Italy

Dugan says that Flavelle was the lead ship. He also gives the name of the airplane as Wingo-Wango rather than Wongo Wongo.

Tony, From B-24 Best Web

It's: Wongo Wongo!

BTW: I've seen others like: "The Wongo Wongo Bird" If I'm not mistaken, Wongo is an Island paradise and the Wongo Bird is a Macaw or Crested Parrot that is kinda crazy.

Ken

[image]local://upfiles/9698/84DFC6CF38934C45936CDF5F0F77579B.jpg[/image]

Attached Image(s)

Ken Alexander
Son of 1st Lt. Clair B. Alexander Jr.
Pilot, B-24s: 10/12/1944 - 04/24/1945
15th AF, 49th Wing, 461st BG, 764th BS
Torretta Airfield, Cerignola, Italy

Ken,

Guy Iovine was the deputy to Brian Flavelle in that flight.  Iovine left the formation and circled the spot on the sea where Flavelle crashed.  He was unable to rejoin the formation.  The fact that some aircraft broke radio silence after the wrong turn is a non-issue; the Luftwaffe already knew they were coming.  Good job in hunting down that photo of Wongo Wongo.  I'll bet the aircraft name is mis spelled in the original documents for so many authors to get it wrong.  Tony Mireles. 

Ken,
 
It is kinda spooky looking at that photo of that airplane, knowing all the troubles and tragedy tied to it.  Tony Mireles

I personally know some of the Tidal Wave  Raiders who are still alive. I mentioned Bob Sternfels before. (I think his phone number is on my WEB),and he will gladly discuss the mission with you. He did relate some data directly from Compton and Compton's Nav. Wicklund in his book "Burning Hitler's Black Gold" (latest edition).  "Killer" Kane's Navigator , Norm Whalen is still alive. I saw him at our reunion last year. However his health is failing fast. "Goady" Zink, Navigator of "THE SQUAH" is also still with us, as is Bill Banks, pilot of "Sad Sack".  As someone noted before, time does seem to dim our memories and also I know from experience my friends might not remember it as I do.
 
As to how "Killer" Kane got the title. There are several versions of that. Perhaps his son (Daughter in Law does most of the record keeping and writing) can answer that. For her address, contact me at BOMBGRP98H@aol.com
 
Herb Harper

Several issues need addressing:
 
First, Ted Timberlake did not fly the mission.  Command of the 93rd BG had passed to Addison Baker who led the 93rd.
 
Brian Flavelle was the lead aircraft of the SECOND element of "A Section".  He was never the lead aircraft, and did not carry the mission navigator as widely reported.  The document AAFRH-3 released in June 44 is the source of this myth.  The mission orders clearly designate Compton as force leader; the 376th formation plan shows Compton as lead and Flavelle in the second element.  Maj. Norman Appold led the "B Section" of the 376th and wrote the chapter addressing Tidal Wave in "The Liberandos".  Appold interviewed many of the participants for his writting including Compton and Wicklund.  Flavelle was never the leader.
 
Per Appold's account (and others), Col. Kane leading the 98th (and thus the 44th and 389th) was 10 minutes behind the first two groups (376, 93) by the time they reached Corfu.  The distance between the first and second formations grew farther during the cloud penetration over the mountains.  Why Kane did not maintain pace and allowed the force to become separated has been explained as differing methods of cruise power setting, but is inexcusable.  The two force elements did not regain sight of each other until they crossed paths over the target.
 
There is no doubt Compton made an error at the wrong turn.  Compton and Ent were distracted deciding how to proceed since only the 93rd BG was still with the 376th.  Their options were to turn back; continue on as only two groups attacking their originally assigned targets; or change and attack the larger refineries assigned to the later groups who may or may not still be following.  At the same time, the force had decended to 500 feet at 180 mph under low clouds, mist and occasional showers.  Both Targoviste and Floresti had railroad tracks leading on basically the same heading which was the landmark to turn.  Again per Appold's account, Compton had resumed control of the a/c when he made his mistake - there was no ordering others to turn or breaking radio silence to make such order.  Wicklund called up that he didn't think they had reached Floresti, but the formation had turned.  Others in the formation did break radio silence to call the wrong turn.
 
To address the original question, Compton remained Commander of the 376 until January '44.  He retired from the Air Force as a Lt. Gen.  As for the 'didn't belong in airplanes' comment someone made, Compton had been Ted Timberlake's Exec in the 93rd BG before being recommended for command and taking over the 376th in Feb '43.  Obviously, Timberlake thought he belonged in airplanes.

MCoffee: Great information. Nicely presented and informative.

Ken

Ken Alexander
Son of 1st Lt. Clair B. Alexander Jr.
Pilot, B-24s: 10/12/1944 - 04/24/1945
15th AF, 49th Wing, 461st BG, 764th BS
Torretta Airfield, Cerignola, Italy

Another , very rare , excellent book is " The Desert Rats " 98th BG by Michael Hill. August 1st Mission.
Lots of stories , pictures , details , orders, intelligence , Briefing materials  etc. 98th targets were Astra Romana and Phoenix Orion. I have it if any questions.
Cheers
 

My father -- David Kellogg -- was the navigator in the plane "Home for Christmas", and I remember him telling me stories about this mission.  However, he never gave me the details I've seen recounted here.

I have been searching for information about his plane and the missions flown.

Stephen A. Kellogg
Son of David A. Kellogg
B-24 Navigator
15th AF, 464 BG (H), 778 Squadron

D, your father probably heard bits & pieces of the story about
that mission like I did (in`44) when he & I were over in Italy.
I was in the 465th. I had never read a complete story like the
one Ken quoted (Kenn C. Rucks book).
I printed it.
BJsassy90

Jules:
Who were the 5 guys who received Medals of Honor
on that raid?
I want to see where they fit into Ken`s report per
Rusks`book.
bjsassy90

Further excerpts from "The 9th Air Force in World War II" By Kenn C. Rust:

The 376th Group thus headed southeast, straight into he outskirts of Bucharest where the error that had been made became crystal clear. Meanwhile, Palm had turned to follow the group and then had changed course as his navigator swore the other planes were wrong. In a short time, Palm found his navigator to be fully correct as the lone B-24 roared in at White 5 where a terrific storm of antiaircraft fire severely damaged the plane and forced it to jettison bombs before a Messerschmitt 109 raked it and sent it to earth in a crash landing. While this was happening, the 32 planes of the 93rd Group (5 had aborted) caught a glimpse of the refineries off to their left and swung over to attack although they were coming in from a completely unbriefed heading against targets they could not exactly identify.

The White 2 Force, led by Col. Addison E. Baker, 93rd CO, with Maj. John L. Jerstad as his co-pilot raced into a deadly hail of machine gun, cannon and heavy flak fire and then a stand of balloon cables as it approached a big target, White 5. Baker was hit, jettisoned his bombs, and with his plane a raging inferno clung to his course leading the formation to the target before the Liberator shattered into the ground. To the right came the White 3 Force of 12 B-24s, and it too, threw itself at a target — White 4. Of these 32 Liberators, eight went down immediately in the target area, one more was lost to fighters after the target, and two were lost through a cloud collision on the return trip.

While the 93rd was smashing into and through the Ploesti defenses, the 376th turned to the left and approached from the south then turned off again in the face of prohibitive defensive fire. It swung around the refineries to the east seeking targets of opportunity, marshaling yards and tank cars northeast of Ploesti. However, one element of five 376th B-24s led by Maj. Norman C. Appold turned into the holocaust and attacked White 2, originally a 93rd target.

Meanwhile, Col. Kane had brought the last three groups over the mountains. There he turned the formation up the Danube, hoping to make contact with the two leading groups. After a few minutes he realized he could not join the others and turned back toward Ploesti. Still, he hoped the third group with him was the 93rd, but when it (the 398th) headed for its lone target, Kane knew he and the 44th would have to go in alone. He turned at the correct IP, [Huh? -Ken] and the two groups roared low toward their briefed targets. As they approached through overcast and rainsqualls they saw the sky, down to the ground, filled with the smoke and flames of oil fires where their targets stood. The 98th bore in on White 4 flying its five-wave attack-front with the 44th Group to its right in two fronts headed for White 5 and Blue 1.

Gun emplacements ahead and to the sides, some in the form of haystacks, opened fire on the bombers. Kane returned it with his front guns and all the gunners joined in with their guns. Directly between the two groups ran the Floresti-Ploesti railroad. On it was a train, speeding in the same direction, which suddenly shed the false sides of boxcars and unlimbered a potent number of light and heavy antiaircraft guns, blasting away at the Liberators to either side. Before return fire smashed the train’s engine, these guns scored heavily on the bombers.

Kane led his five waves (named in order, Eagle, Fox, Pike, Hawk and Wolf) straight at their targets. Eagle, with Kane at the front, had lost one plane on takeoff and three had aborted so that only six raced into the inferno at White 4. The two planes on the left fell to flak in the target area, one was badly damaged but made it through the target and then took up a heading for Turkey. Kane and the other two also came through the terror of the target, and made it to Cyprus. There Kane’s HAIL COLUMBIA (with one engine out since Ploesti, over 20 hits by 20mm and 40mm shells, and countless bullet holes) was demolished on landing. Fox brought ten planes into the target, and one on the right flank next to the flak train fell in the target area. The other nine planes came through and headed for home. Pike, one plane aborting on the way to the target, lost three planes to flak from its right flank, but the remaining six made it through the target. Hawk brought all ten planes to the target, lost three on the far right to flak, came off target and lost the leader’s wingman to a fighter attack. Wolf, which started with eight planes, lost two through aborts, came in with six, lost two B-24s on the right flank and two on the left to flak, and then lost its flight leader to enemy fighters immediately after the target, and only one Wolf plane returned to base. But if the 98th paid a terrible price, it gave as well as it took, for White 4, the most important refinery in Ploesti, had one-half of its productive capacity eliminated in the fire and explosions wrought by Liberator bombs. On the way home, two Pike planes and one Fox B-24 were hit and lost to enemy fighters over Bulgaria.

While the 98th took out White 4, Col. Leon W. Johnson, CO of the 44th, led the White 5 force into its target, also being forced to fly into the face of a target already alive with explosions. There was also the possibility of delayed action bombs going off at any moment, from the 93rd attack, and the hailstorm of aroused antiaircraft fire. Sixteen Liberators went in and nine came out in a flyable condition. The other 44th unit, Blue 1, swung to the right and had a clean run on their untouched target with 21 aircraft. They got through the flak without loss, shattered their target but then ran into enemy fighter, which knocked two of their planes down.

As the 98th and 44th were going through hell at Ploesti proper, the 389th had taken up a heading for its lone target, Red1. The least experienced group in the attack also made a wrong turn on approach to the target, but caught it, corrected it and came in on the refinery as planned with 29 aircraft. Each plane took its target, and Red 1 was completely destroyed in a few minutes, although four aircraft were lost to flak in the target area. One of these had been flown by 2nd Lt. Lloyd D. Hughes. Coming into the target his Liberator was hard hit by all types of ground fire and began spewing sheets of gasoline from the left wing and bomb bay tank. Though he could have put down in any of several grain fields, Hughes persisted on to the target. After successfully bombing his objective, Hughes’ Liberator emerged from the flames that engulfed Red 1 with his left wing afire. Doggedly he guided the bomber toward a lakebed for a crash landing only to be blocked by a bridge. Somehow he pulled up and slid down again only to catch his right wing on the riverbank and cartwheel to blazing destruction.

Ken

Ken Alexander
Son of 1st Lt. Clair B. Alexander Jr.
Pilot, B-24s: 10/12/1944 - 04/24/1945
15th AF, 49th Wing, 461st BG, 764th BS
Torretta Airfield, Cerignola, Italy

Medal of Honor winners were:
Lt. Col. Addison E. Baker
Major John L. Jerstad
Col. John R. Kane
Lt. Lloyd D. Hughes
Col. Leon W. Johnson
 
Vic

Before I forget, Kenn C. Rust's book, "The 9th Air Force in World War II," from which I got the account of the Ploesti attack was originally written in 1967. Much has been written since about the mission.

The author credits OUT IN THE BLUE an unpublished manuscript based on the diary of Col. John R. Kane. "It served greatly in lighting many dark corners of the 9th's history in the desert and at Ploesti."

So be aware that there is most likely some personal bias built into the account as written.

Ken

Ken Alexander
Son of 1st Lt. Clair B. Alexander Jr.
Pilot, B-24s: 10/12/1944 - 04/24/1945
15th AF, 49th Wing, 461st BG, 764th BS
Torretta Airfield, Cerignola, Italy

John L Jerstad (0-435784) - Ardennes Cemetary - Plot C Row 24 Grave 10
Addison E Baker (0-280827) - Florence Italy - Wall Of Missing
 

Thanks for posting that information DELMELLE.

Ken

Ken Alexander
Son of 1st Lt. Clair B. Alexander Jr.
Pilot, B-24s: 10/12/1944 - 04/24/1945
15th AF, 49th Wing, 461st BG, 764th BS
Torretta Airfield, Cerignola, Italy

Ken,

That picture of the B-24 "Wongo Wongo" can be found in the Michael Hill book "Black Sunday: Ploesti" and also in the Leroy W. Newby book "Into the Guns of Ploesti".  The airplane is definitely "Wongo Wongo".  Just finished reading the Dugan/Stewart book "Ploesti: The Great Ground-Air Battle of 1 August 1943." And I am beginning to read the Newby book.  Still looking for Newby's "Target Ploesti: View from a Bombsight."  Will get it through the inter-library loan system. 

Got to wonder how all those authors got the name of "Wongo Wongo" wrong.  Must be wrong on the official documents.  The Michael Hill book offers so much about this mission.  I am believing that the mission lead aircraft was the B-24 "Teggie Ann" piloted by Compton as is suggested in the Hill book and one of the forum member posts.  Thanks mcoffee for giving us the document that led to the "myth" of the lead aircraft crashing. 

The thing that bugs me about the Michael Hill book is the lack of an index.  How did the editors at Schiffer let that happen?  I am tempted to index it myself to make it useful as a reference book.  I have made a list of indexed items for my own use because of this project. 

  &