Reply to post

Kassel Mission 9-27-44

Page: 12 > Showing page 1 of 2
Author
JCBeckwith
Group Member
  • Total Posts : 188
  • Reward points : 2623
  • Joined: 2008/03/19 19:42:37
  • Status: offline
2009/08/27 21:32:02 (permalink)
0

Kassel Mission 9-27-44

I wasn't sure where to post this.  I have looked over mission records for the 448th and found that they also flew to Kassel on both 9-27 and 9-28 1944.  I know that on 9-27 the 445th took a beating with only four planes returning to base.  What other groups flew to Kassel that day?  Where the groups staggered?  Did they miss a rondevous?  Did some BG's have fighter cover and the 445th didn't?  I am just very curious about this mission and all of the questions that have been asked about it.  As always, the help is always appreciated.  Thanks.
 
John 

33 Replies Related Threads

    Mike.Simpson
    Wing Member
    • Total Posts : 512
    • Reward points : 5259
    • Joined: 2003/07/28 08:30:54
    • Location: San Tan Valley, AZ
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2009/08/28 09:24:59 (permalink)
    0
    John:
     
    The debate over what happened with the 445th that fateful September day rages on today.  The field order spelled out that the 445th was lead for the 2nd Bomb Wing (made up of the 389th, 445th, and 453rd Bomb Groups) and would be in the middle of the 2nd Air Division portion of the bomber stream.  The few navigational notes that are floating around tend to lead me to believe that with the 10/10s cloud cover that day, it was impossible to see any ground references.  That, coupled with a 76 knot wind out of the west (almost a dead-on tailwind), suggests that the Dead Reckoning (DR) navigator was "behind the power curve" and uncertain as to his location.  He flew past the last checkpoint prior to turning towards the IP, then had to make a mid-course correction due to the winds out of the west.
     
    When they reached the IP, they made a sharper turn than the rest of the wing and thats when things really started to go wrong.  The 445th began to edge out of the main stream despite calls from other aircraft.  Major Don McCoy (Air Commander) went with his lead nav's heading request and radioed the rest of the 445th aircraft to form up on him and that they would bomb as a group.  Due to no ground reference, they couldn't see that they covered 13 more miles from the IP to the target because of the tailwind.
     
    After bombing the outskirts of Gottingen, they followed the planned route to the ralley point with a left turn, followed by a series of right turns which strung out the formation badly.  While all of this was happening, Luftwaffe ground control scrambled everything they could find and managed to get approximately 100 Fw-190s and 50 Bf-109Gs as top cover into position outside the range of the 445th's guns.
     
    They struck when the 445th made another right turn to pick up the planned return route, coming from astern and low.  They shot up the tail gunners and waist positions (no ball turrets that day).  The Fw-190s made the main attack with their heavier 20mm and 30mm cannon.  The Bf-109s made a final run through before the panicked 'Mayday' calls finally got the attention of the escorting fighters.  Only their quick response kept the 445th from being totally wiped out.  Of the 35 aircraft that bombed that day, 25 were shot down within 4 minutes.  Of the remaining 10 aircraft, 3 crash landed on the Continent behind friendly lines; two managed to make it into Manston; one crashed between Old Buckingham and Tibenham (home of the 445th); and four returned to the home field!  Four out of thirty-five!
     
    As to your question about what other groups flew that day, all of the 2nd Air Division was up that day - all three bomb wings.  The 445th, leading 2nd Bomb Wing, was in the middle of the stream - leading the 389th and 453rd Bomb Groups.  If the order of the day was to maintain formation integrity, then why didn't the 389th and 453rd follow the lead group?  The sight of a full bomb wing might have put off the deadly attack - might have.
     
    One thing that has puzzled me was the lack of concern over not seeing many Luftwaffe fighter attacks after D-Day.  The 445th losses prior to this were almost exclusively from flak.  German records show fighter production was nearly at it's peak during the Fall of 1944.  Unfortunately, survivors of that day are few and their days are numbered.  We're trying to find out the truth - was it a navigational error, or did the 445th have a specific target known only to them?

    Mike Simpson
    VP, Heritage League of the 2nd Air Division
    Webmaster & Unit Historian
    445th Bomb Group (Heavy)
    www.445bg.org
    Erich
    Group Member
    • Total Posts : 414
    • Reward points : 2226
    • Joined: 2002/07/01 16:19:05
    • Location: Oregon, USA
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2009/09/20 11:06:59 (permalink)
    0
    truth is the LW ground control did not send up all it's LW fighters.  the 3 Sturmgruppen were sent to look for the trail of bombers and only by chance it was found the 445th bg was out of formation line and thus was hit, the LW ground contr. could not tell if escorts were about or not and it did not matter the 3 sturmgruppen with high elelement of Bf 109G-6's of I./JG 300 made the perfect fatal bounce

    Nur die jenigen, die man vergisst, sind wirklich tot
    Jinglelady
    Squadron Member
    • Total Posts : 83
    • Reward points : 2264
    • Joined: 2007/06/03 10:30:42
    • Location: Michigan
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2009/10/11 21:03:08 (permalink)
    0
    Hi Erich,
     
    I've also been in touch recently with William Beyer, who became an ace-in-a-day when the 361st FG arrived and saved the few B-24's left in the air. According to Mr. Beyer, they did not hear the call for fighter support; Vic Bocquin, their squadron leader saw a German fighter diving into the clouds east of Kassel, and began pursuit.
     
     

    Linda Alice Dewey
    Kassel Mission Author
    rhammans
    Group Member
    • Total Posts : 313
    • Reward points : 2301
    • Joined: 2005/11/12 20:25:46
    • Location: Iowa
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2009/10/14 19:11:45 (permalink)
    0
    John,

    You may also want to occasionally visit the Kassel Mission Historical Society's website at http://www.kasselmission.com/. There are quite a few personal stories there, and it's updated fairly frequently. The main person involved is now writing  book on the mission, so there is bound to be some new information showing up.

    They also have a Facebook page up (as do we).

    (I just noticed I missed Linda's earlier post about the KM website. I'll leave this one up anyway, since it does mention their Facebook page.)

    Reed Hammans
    Heritage League of the Second Air Division
    http://www.heritageleague.org


    drgondog
    Group Member
    • Total Posts : 412
    • Reward points : 3644
    • Joined: 2005/07/28 11:44:34
    • Location: Dallas, Texas
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/09/09 18:01:06 (permalink)
    0
    Mike.Simpson

    John:
     
    The debate over what happened with the 445th that fateful September day rages on today.  The field order spelled out that the 445th was lead for the 2nd Bomb Wing (made up of the 389th, 445th, and 453rd Bomb Groups) and would be in the lead of the 2nd Air Division portion of the bomber stream.  The few navigational notes that are floating around tend to lead me to believe that with the 10/10s cloud cover that day, it was impossible to see any ground references.  That, coupled with a 76 knot wind out of the west (almost a dead-on tailwind), suggests that the Dead Reckoning (DR) navigator was "behind the power curve" and uncertain as to his location.  He flew past the last checkpoint prior to turning towards the IP, then had to make a mid-course correction due to the winds out of the west.
     
    When they reached the IP, they made a sharper turn to eastward than the rest of the wing.  They went east-southeast while the rest of the 2BD proceeded southeast form the IP - and thats when things really started to go wrong.  The 445th began to edge out of the main stream despite calls from other aircraft in their own group.  Major Don McCoy (Air Commander) went with his lead nav's heading request and radioed the rest of the 445th aircraft to form up on him and that they would bomb as a group.  Due to no ground reference, they couldn't see that they covered 13 more miles from the IP to the target because of the tailwind. The rest of the 2CW proceeded  southeaat to Kassel as planed anf the rest of the 2BD followed them while the 445th headed toward Gottingen.
     
    After bombing the outskirts of Gottingen, they followed the planned route to the rally point with a right turn to the south, which strung out the formation badly.  While all of this was happening, Luftwaffe ground control scrambled everything they could find and managed to get approximately 100 Fw-190s and 50 Bf-109Gs as top cover into position outside the range of the 445th's guns.
     
    They struck when the 445th made another right turn to pick up the planned return route westward from eschwege/eisenach area, coming from astern and low.  They shot up the tail gunners and waist positions (no ball turrets that day).  The Fw-190s made the main attack with their heavier 20mm and 30mm cannon.  The Bf-109s made a final run through before the panicked 'Mayday' calls finally got the attention of the escorting fighters.  Only their quick response kept the 445th from being totally wiped out.  Of the 35 aircraft that bombed that day, 25 were shot down within 4 minutes.  Of the remaining 10 aircraft, 3 crash landed on the Continent behind friendly lines; two managed to make it into Manston; one crashed between Old Buckingham and Tibenham (home of the 445th); and four returned to the home field!  Four out of thirty-five!
     
    As to your question about what other groups flew that day, all of the 2nd Air Division was up that day - all three bomb wings.  The 445th, leading 2nd Bomb Wing, was in the head of the stream - leading the 389th and 453rd Bomb Groups.  If the order of the day was to maintain formation integrity, then why didn't the 389th and 453rd follow the lead group?  The sight of a full bomb wing might have put off the deadly attack - might have.
     
    One thing that has puzzled me was the lack of concern over not seeing many Luftwaffe fighter attacks after D-Day.  The 445th losses prior to this were almost exclusively from flak.  German records show fighter production was nearly at it's peak during the Fall of 1944.  Unfortunately, survivors of that day are few and their days are numbered.  We're trying to find out the truth - was it a navigational error, or did the 445th have a specific target known only to them?


    Mike - help me understand more about the course. The IP IIRC was northwest of Kassel and the bomb run required a southeast turn from the IP to go to Kassel.  Gottingen was north-northeast of Kassel and the Rally point near Eisenach was southeast of Kassel and south of Gottingen.
     
    The would be a right turn unless the course from Zwolle/Apeldoorn went due west before turning south toward the IP. However, If the bomber stream was heading more or less due east as you mention relative to tailwind, the turn from the IP would have been right ~ 135 degrees.  The 445th turn toward Gottingen would have been either a lesser turn toward the east southeast or, if the IP was about the same latitude as Gottingen, then no turn at all while the rest of 2BD headed southeast for Kassel. 
     
    Further, if the above reference points are correct, the 445th after bombing Gottingen (presumably they recognized it) they would turn almost due south from an easterly bomb run and head toward the Rally point near Eisenach.
     
    The 355th FG was escorting the first two boxes of the lead BW and made R/V between Zwolle and Apeldoorn.  Everett Stewart was leading the 355th with the 354FS. They had an uneventful mission until after bomb run and reaching the Rally point near Eisenach.  He heard a call for help and sent two flights (Green and Blue) to the north from the Rally point to help.
     
    Henry Brown and Deacon Priest made contact ~1000-1008 between Eisenach and Gottingen with ~ 10 Fw 190s and chased them, shooting down three (2/1 respectively). The other flight made contact with another batch but did not score.  Presumably these were Sturm./JG3 Fw's.
    post edited by drgondog - 2010/10/16 22:07:49
    Jinglelady
    Squadron Member
    • Total Posts : 83
    • Reward points : 2264
    • Joined: 2007/06/03 10:30:42
    • Location: Michigan
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/10/16 21:14:40 (permalink)
    0
    Does anyone know where we can get a table of MPI (Mean Point of Impact) coordinates for the timeframe around 27 Sept 1944? We have just made a very important discovery.
    drgondog
    Group Member
    • Total Posts : 412
    • Reward points : 3644
    • Joined: 2005/07/28 11:44:34
    • Location: Dallas, Texas
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/10/16 21:53:04 (permalink)
    0
    Two things. according to 355th FG Histories they were assigned to the leading two boxes of the 2nd BD and the 445st was leading the 2CW.  According to the survivors of the 445th, McCoy's lead B-24 headed east-southeast toward Gottingen, the rest of the 445th navigators called the lead ship about their error but McCoy chose to attack Gottingen rather than do a 360 and try to get back into position.
     
    The rest of the 2BD continued past Kassel and made a turn to~ 270 degrees before the 445th even bombed Gottingen.  By the time the 445th reached Eschewege and turned west at 1000, the rest of the 2nd Div (and escorts) were nearly 100 miles to the west.
     
    Although the theory that the 445th was on a special assignment there are no facts to suggest McCoy and the 445th were so tasked.
     
    The 445th bombed via PFF into a 10/10 cloud cover. Ther could be no strike photos and only possibility of an MPI/BDA assesssment would be a post strike recon photo - unknown.
    Jinglelady
    Squadron Member
    • Total Posts : 83
    • Reward points : 2264
    • Joined: 2007/06/03 10:30:42
    • Location: Michigan
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/10/16 22:34:01 (permalink)
    0
    drgondog

    Two things. according to 355th FG Histories they were assigned to the leading two boxes of the 2nd BD and the 445st was leading the 2CW.  According to the survivors of the 445th, McCoy's lead B-24 headed east-southeast toward Gottingen, the rest of the 445th navigators called the lead ship about their error but McCoy chose to attack Gottingen rather than do a 360 and try to get back into position.
     
    The rest of the 2BD continued past Kassel and made a turn to~ 270 degrees before the 445th even bombed Gottingen.  By the time the 445th reached Eschewege and turned west at 1000, the rest of the 2nd Div (and escorts) were nearly 100 miles to the west.
     
    Although the theory that the 445th was on a special assignment there are no facts to suggest McCoy and the 445th were so tasked.
     
    The 445th bombed via PFF into a 10/10 cloud cover. Ther could be no strike photos and only possibility of an MPI/BDA assesssment would be a post strike recon photo - unknown.

     
    Some of what you say still holds as true. However, we are in possession of new evidence but need an MPI table to verify. Do you know where one can be accessed? In addition, there is indeed a strike photo. We have obtained it from Maxwell. It was not 10-10ths everywhere.
     

    Linda Alice Dewey
    Kassel Mission Author
    drgondog
    Group Member
    • Total Posts : 412
    • Reward points : 3644
    • Joined: 2005/07/28 11:44:34
    • Location: Dallas, Texas
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/10/17 11:41:02 (permalink)
    0
    Linda - There seems to be significant doubt cast on whether the target was obscured.
     
    This account from Frank Bertram who was on the PFF ship casts doubt regarding 'target visibility' from http://www.tankbooks.com/ninelives/chapter7.htm
     
    "The target was not visible from the air, but with the radar scope we had the target picked up, and with the little that we did see from the air to the ground, and the paperwork I was doing, we knew where we were exactly.
        We were not the only one that caught the mistake. I think almost every plane in the formation that had a halfway good navigator called immediately and saw what was going on. You could actually look out the pilot’s window and see the flak off to the right, which we were supposed to be going through. Why we kept going to the left we’ll never know. We never did find out.
        We released the bombs near the town of Goettingen. As it happened it was in an open field; probably killed a couple of cows. Then we followed our regular method to come out of the bomb run and head for home. That was a left turn off the target; a right turn, which took us on a southeast heading; another right turn, which took us on a southwest heading; then another turn to the right, which took us on a northwest heading"
     
    For the moment, assume that one of the four or from the crash landed survivors a Strike photo was recovered.  That would clearly show cloud cover, but not necessarily the intended target - just what appeared below at "bombs away".  We hope there was a target.
     
    As to an MPI - that would be developed post strike by Group Ops which would find THE target in the photo and construct circles around the bomb patter - then find the centroid for the MPI.  If Gottingen was not a documented target it would not have the specific target in the Target files.  If it was for September the 27th there shouldn't be so much controversy regarding the Mission.  If it was a Seconday Target it would have been in the files, a post strike recon mission would get the post strike bomb pattern and we would be in business for an MPI discussion.
     
    None of these collateral assets seem to be in evidence so where do you go from here? 
     
    Jinglelady
    Squadron Member
    • Total Posts : 83
    • Reward points : 2264
    • Joined: 2007/06/03 10:30:42
    • Location: Michigan
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/10/17 12:19:00 (permalink)
    0
    We have a diary and other accounts that say that although it was 9-10ths it wasn't completely obscured everywhere. We have a photo as well. The diary says that they saw through a hole in the clouds that the bombs were hitting buildings. This diary was written by the engineer from the lead (Chilton) plane.
     
    MPI is stated in the Field Order, before takeoff.
     
    I know Frank Bertram. He's a good guy.
     
    Do you know where we can find MPI tables? Also Gee H coordinates for that date? It is my understanding that MPIs are correct to within .2 km, and that these coordinates were set into the computers (they had computers onboard!) BEFORE takeoff.
     
    The report that the bombs fell only in a field was a government report that was incorrect, which is not uncommon.
     
    Again, we need MPI tables and Gee H coordinates. Do you know where we can find these? Savannah is helping us, but we have not found them as yet.
    drgondog
    Group Member
    • Total Posts : 412
    • Reward points : 3644
    • Joined: 2005/07/28 11:44:34
    • Location: Dallas, Texas
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/10/17 12:48:04 (permalink)
    0
    Jinglelady

    We have a diary and other accounts that say that although it was 9-10ths it wasn't completely obscured everywhere. We have a photo as well. The diary says that they saw through a hole in the clouds that the bombs were hitting buildings. This diary was written by the engineer from the lead (Chilton) plane.
     
    MPI is stated in the Field Order, before takeoff.
     
    I know Frank Bertram. He's a good guy.
     
    Do you know where we can find MPI tables? Also Gee H coordinates for that date? It is my understanding that MPIs are correct to within .2 km, and that these coordinates were set into the computers (they had computers onboard!) BEFORE takeoff.
     
    The report that the bombs fell only in a field was a government report that was incorrect, which is not uncommon.
     
    Again, we need MPI tables and Gee H coordinates. Do you know where we can find these? Savannah is helping us, but we have not found them as yet.

    The quote regarding "bombs into a field" was Frank's direct quote in his personal article - how would that be a "government" quote.
     
    As to MPI. Mean point of impact is a calculated centroid of all the dispersed bomb impacts surrounding a Designated Aim Point.
     
    To get an MPI, one first has to have the Point of Aim on a Mission planning photo, then a post strike photo which shows all the bomb impacts, then calculate the MPI and compare against the Point of Aim to assess bombing accuracy.  The end result is one photo with a documented Aim Point, the surrounding bomb craters, and the resultant calculated MPI also on the same map.
     
    The first document you have to have to start the process is the Target Photo for Gottingen 27, September 1944.  Without that, there is no evidence that Gotting was either a Primary, a Secondary or a Target of Opportunity.
     
    Everything after that is based on the first designation of Target and Aiming point.  The second document would be the selected radar image of the target area which further clarifies the target and the surrounding radar reflections to find 'the area".
     
    If the Gottingen target was actually defined and documented for 27 September, much of the mystery leaves the table.  Then the only questions remaining would be a.) Was there a specific aim point designated as a Primary Target (i.e Gottingen University?)for 445th? and b.) secret orders to go alone? c.) orders to bomb by radar if visual sighting not so good.   The a. and b. parts should be in the Mission Summary for 8th AF, c.) might be available, and b.) might be non-existant.
    Jinglelady
    Squadron Member
    • Total Posts : 83
    • Reward points : 2264
    • Joined: 2007/06/03 10:30:42
    • Location: Michigan
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/10/17 13:32:03 (permalink)
    0
    MPI is in the Field Order given before takeoff. I have a copy of that order. What they do with it afterwards is something else, but it's in Paragraph 2A of the Field Order, and the MPI is different for the 445th and a single squadron of the 453rd that carried incendiaries. We have an answer for the third question: yes, there were provisional orders and a codeword to bomb as a group if weather circumstances dictated, decision to be made by McCoy.
     
     
    Again, we need a map, version 14, showing MPIs and Gee coordinates. Do you know where we can find one that is current for 27 Sept 44.

    Linda Alice Dewey
    Kassel Mission Author
    Jinglelady
    Squadron Member
    • Total Posts : 83
    • Reward points : 2264
    • Joined: 2007/06/03 10:30:42
    • Location: Michigan
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/10/17 13:35:54 (permalink)
    0
    Here is a portion of that Field Order. Note Paragraph 2A, MPI .
    drgondog
    Group Member
    • Total Posts : 412
    • Reward points : 3644
    • Joined: 2005/07/28 11:44:34
    • Location: Dallas, Texas
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/10/17 21:10:58 (permalink)
    0
    Linda - there is no Paragraph 2A.  Paragraph 1, states that Kassel and Gottingen were bombed  - but NO results observed? and No Mpi if=dentified or discussed.
     
    What are tou referring to.  If there is a target assinment other than Leaflet bomblets for the 445th, where is it?
    Jinglelady
    Squadron Member
    • Total Posts : 83
    • Reward points : 2264
    • Joined: 2007/06/03 10:30:42
    • Location: Michigan
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/10/18 08:39:43 (permalink)
    0
    I'm sorry. I had enlarged it for you so that you could see the relevant information. Here is the first page of Field Order 279. This is a Field Order, sent around midnight the morning of 9-27-44. It pre-sets the MPI, as seen in 2.A. near the last column on the right. Note the groups have the same "Target" but different MPI's.
     
    Again, we need the Gee H map current for 9-27-44 to be sure this is telling us what we think it is. See my previous emails for more detail.
     
     
    Well, it won't upload. Why don't you email me and I will send it to you. kmhs@kasselmission.com

    Attached Image(s)

    drgondog
    Group Member
    • Total Posts : 412
    • Reward points : 3644
    • Joined: 2005/07/28 11:44:34
    • Location: Dallas, Texas
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/10/18 09:35:49 (permalink)
    0
    Linda -  
     I got it Frag order) - a couple of comments. 
    First numbers in the MPI column are the specific target designator.... there would have been a large map in Group Inteeligence file, within which would be photos and supporting information for targets "069067/14" and "070058/14"
    Second comment - Both the single squadron of the 453rd and the entire 445th were combat wing 2A and the other two groups were 2B - comprised of 5 squadrons each.
    Third - the 453rd BG single squadron attached to 445th in 2A was designated one minute in trail of 445th.
    Fourth - both that squadron and the other four squadrons of the 445th were tasked to bomb target "70058/14" 1000# GP for the 445th and Incindieries for the 453rd squadron.
    Fifth - the 453rd squadron in 2A, behind the 445th, did Not follow the 445th but went to Kassel - indicating that their target was indeed a Kassel target - implying that the 445th should have bombed that same target -
     
    BTW - I looked at the frag order - it was clear that a decision should be made near 51degrees 49 min N and 08 degrees 20 minutes east - just west of Gutersloh and exactly NW of Kassel - regarding bomb by PFF or visual. That was the IP and the bomb run of about 60 miles was southeast to Kassel
     
    Additionally it contained no separate instructions for the 445th to take another heading at the IP, separate from the rest of 2A and 2B in the Frag order.
     
    The mission summary states "No observed results' implying PFF was selected for all prior to the bomb run from Gutersloh.
     
    The narrative I posted for you from one of the survivors stated bombing in a field implies PFF, which also coincides with Mission Summary results.
     
    There is conclusive evidence that the 445th simply made a Nav error, and supported by the 453rd Sq in 2A staying with 2B (and becoming lead ship for a now enlarged six squadron attack on both "069067/14" and 070058/14" targets, presumably two slightly separated Henschel factories.
     
    Roger Freeman also notes that "All targets for 8th AF were bombed by PFF" but his source was the top summary 8th AF reports which consolidated all the Group summaries. 
    Thanks for the Frag Order and summary - I was also able to finally get the Task Force order of assembly - and the 20CW was in front of 2A-2B with the trailing two CW,s behind 2.
     
    Regards,
     
    Bill
    Jinglelady
    Squadron Member
    • Total Posts : 83
    • Reward points : 2264
    • Joined: 2007/06/03 10:30:42
    • Location: Michigan
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/10/18 12:17:14 (permalink)
    0
    Phil,
    Our interpretations agree on everything excepting your assumption #5. Everything from that point hinges on your assumption that the target for the 445th wing was a Kassel target. The numbers are very different, and until we get the map, neither of us knows for sure. Right?
     
     The 20th CW led the division that day, and that was led by the 446th BG. It is possible that the IB squadron from the 453rd broke orders by going with the rest of the 453rd. Frank Bertram only believes the bombs fell in a field because of what he was told afterwards. He didn't see them land in a field. The Germans, however, did see that. However, another eyewitness says more was killed than just an ox or a cow.
    drgondog
    Group Member
    • Total Posts : 412
    • Reward points : 3644
    • Joined: 2005/07/28 11:44:34
    • Location: Dallas, Texas
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/10/19 08:01:23 (permalink)
    0
    Linda - my assumption the the 445th target was a Kassel target is because it had the target designator as the 453rd squadron attached to the 445th in CW 2--
    A... But the 453rd squadron did not follow the 444th when it broke for Gottingen - it went to Kassel with the 2-B CW.

    Ergo - either secret orders not contained in the Frag Order over rode the Frag Order, or the 445th made The Nav error that everyone reported. also notable is that no secondary target was specified. that is logical because the bombing method was specified PFF if visibility nil.

    having said that, "secret orders" could eve been issued to lead Nav/bombardier - but not to rest of the 445th?
    Jinglelady
    Squadron Member
    • Total Posts : 83
    • Reward points : 2264
    • Joined: 2007/06/03 10:30:42
    • Location: Michigan
    • Status: offline
    Re:Kassel Mission 9-27-44 2010/10/19 08:19:56 (permalink)
    0
    Is a Frag Order the order for a fragment of the Division? (i.e., the 2CW?
    Page: 12 > Showing page 1 of 2
    Jump to:
    © 2014 APG vNext Commercial Version 5.0